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THE RELATIONSHIP between Russia, Ukraine and
the European Union over gas supplies has been
difficult since the early 1990s. The interim deal of
30 October 2014 was primarily meant to
guarantee stable supplies to the EU during winter
2014-15 after Russia stopped supplies to Ukraine
in June (see Box 1 on page 3). The deal does not
address the underlying causes of the Ukraine-
Russia gas conflict which go deeper than a
disagreement about prices and debt. Also at issue
are the scope for revisions to long-term gas supply
and transit contracts, the admissibility of reverse
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flows from the EU to Ukraine and, more generally,
the future structure of the Russia-Ukraine-EU
relationship.
The 30 October deal allowed all these crucial
issues to be kept open (Box 1). In parallel to the
Ukrainian-Russian gas crisis, there also is a Euro-
pean-Russian crisis. Russia and the EU have dis-
agreed for several years on the rules of their gas
relationship. These disagreements are manifested
in disputes about the regulatory treatment of the
South Stream project1 and the OPAL pipeline2, an
Sources: Bruegel based on IEA Gas Trade Flows in Europe; Nord Stream website.
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investigation by European competition authorities
of the possible anticompetitive behaviour of
Gazprom in the EU gas market and discussions
about the legality of European gas exports to
Ukraine (so called reverse flows3). In most of
these conflicts, different EU member states take
very different position, based on widely diverging
interests. Finally, there is also an EU-Ukrainian
dimension to the crisis. Ukraine has used its piv-
otal role for gas transit in the past irrespective of
the EU's interests. And the opacity of the Ukrain-
ian gas sector fuels persistent doubt about the
credibility of Ukrainian commitments. 
BOX 1: A SHORT HISTORY OF THE RECENT GAS DISPUTE
The difficult Russia-Ukraine relationship over gas has at least twice resulted in gas crises that affected the
stability of gas transit to the EU (in 2006 and 2009)4. The current gas conflict started when Russia in April
2014 (1) withdrew the politically-motivated gas price discount granted to Ukraine under Viktor Yanukovych
in December 20135, (2) cancelled the reduction in gas-export duties granted for hosting the Russian Black
Sea fleet in Crimea6 and (3) asked for the repayment of Ukraine's huge gas debts (earlier postponed several
times). Ukraine did not accept a return to the 2009 price formula – which implied a hike in the gas price from
$268.50 to $485 per thousand cubic metres (tcm). The parties started to negotiate both the gas price and
conditions of debt repayment and in parallel filed suits against each other at the Stockholm International Arbi-
tration Court. The negotiations continued largely thanks to the EUs engagement but finally failed in June
2014. Subsequently Russia stopped exporting gas to Ukraine. Until the end of October 2014 several rounds
of negotiations were held in which the energy ministers of Ukraine and Russia, the heads of Gazprom and
Naftogaz and the EU Energy Commissioner were involved. 
There are three major points of conflict:
1 Ukraine’s debts arising from past gas deliveries: Ukraine acknowledges $3.1 billion; Russia claims at
least7 $5.3 billion. The differences stem from different prices acknowledged for past deliveries.
2 The nature of the price agreement: Ukraine wants to revise the 2009 supply contract it claims was only
signed under huge pressure and because of substantial changes in market conditions, while Russia wants
longer-term confirmation of the contracted price formula and agrees only to discretionary and thus
reversible reductions in export taxes. 
3 Conditions of gas transit via Ukraine: Russia wants Ukraine to provide gas and storage facilities to ensure
a smooth gas transit and to stick to the terms of the 2009 transit contract, while Ukraine wants to treat gas
storage as a separate service, and aims to renegotiate its gas transit agreement with Russia and align it
to EU law.
In essence, Ukraine wanted to use the negotiations in 2014 to modify the 2009 gas contract that required
it to buy excessive volumes (contractual minimum offtake is 41.6 billion cubic metres (bcm)8, while 2013
import demand was 29 bcm) at excessive prices from Gazprom.
The 30 October interim agreement allowed Ukraine to restart imports of Russian gas during the winter at a
price of $385/tcm, on condition of $3.1bn in debt repayment and prepayments for future supplies9. The revi-
sion of the 2009 contract and the debt settlement was de facto shifted to the Stockholm court. But we expect
that the court will encourage renegotiations instead of prescribing a compromise. So the conflict over these
issues will be opened up again no later than after the Stockholm settlement. In fact, because of already vis-
ible misunderstandings10 and the diverging long-term interests of the parties, the deal might not even sur-
vive the 2014-15 winter.
In the next section we describe Russia's, the EU’s
and Ukraine's goals and the instruments at their
disposal. We then describe three possible scenar-
ios for the development of the trilateral gas rela-
tionship and suggest some steps to be taken in
order to secure the more positive outcome.
WHO WANTS TO ACHIEVE WHAT?
In the trilateral gas negotiations, longer-term
objectives largely determined the tactical posi-
tions of Ukraine and Russia, while the EU was
mostly preoccupied with the short-term challenge
of ensuring gas supply security this winter.
flows. This includes buying corresponding
assets14,  excluding competitors from using them15
and securing capacity with long-term contracts. 
On the downstream side, Gazprom tries to con-
clude contracts that essentially lock-in its domi-
nant role. Clauses that prevent re-export
(‘destination clauses’) do not need to be explicit
in the contracts, because EU downstream compa-
nies are well aware that not playing by Gazprom's
rules might undermine their position in the next
round of negotiations16. Long term take-or-pay
contracts make it unattractive for countries in
which Gazprom currently enjoys a dominant posi-
tion to diversify, because the contracted volumes
would still have to be paid for, even if diversifica-
tion allows imports to be reduced. Additionally
Gazprom, because of its production costs, scale of
operation and established position on the EU gas
market, is able to reduce gas prices in order to limit
possibilities for newcomers entering the market17.
Furthermore, Gazprom actively lobbies within the
EU to prevent legislation that would reduce its abil-
ity to separate markets18. Finally, Gazprom moves
down the value chain in the EU and establishes
cross-ownership with large European incumbents.
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Russia
Russia’s gas-related goals are both economic and
political. As the world’s largest gas exporter and
thanks to its huge untapped reserves11 gas will
remain an important economic factor for Russia.
In 2013, gas accounted for 14 percent of the coun-
try’s total exports. Consequently, the main eco-
nomic interest of Russia is to ensure sustainably
high gas exports at a price as high as possible.
Gazprom12 and its monopoly on pipeline13 gas
exports has been for many years a key instrument
enabling Russia to achieve this. Gazprom tries to
maximise revenues by discriminating between
customers. Those customers that have sufficient
alternative suppliers (eg in north-western Europe)
are granted much lower prices than those that
have no alternatives (eg central and eastern
Europe). One of Russia’s main objectives in Europe
is to defend this very profitable strategy. Main-
taining market segmentation requires preventing
cheap gas from the competitive markets from
flooding the monopolistic markets. Hence,
Gazprom does everything it can to control the use
of corresponding infrastructure to prevent such
Source: Bruegel. Note: * thousand cubic metres.
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This helps Gazprom to better understand its main
export market, and gives it some leverage in leg-
islative discussions and increases the flexibility
of Gazprom to re-route transit, separate markets
and increase its market power.
To bring gas to Europe, Gazprom has still to rely on
transit countries. This dependence reduces
Gazprom's profits because transit states want to
share them. In addition, transit exposes Russian
exports to technical, legal or political problems
with transit states. This was the reason for
Gazprom pursuing the strategy of diversification
of its export routes – building the Yamal-Europe
gas pipeline through Belarus, Blue Stream through
the Black Sea to Turkey, Nord Stream through the
Baltic Sea to Germany and planning to build South
Stream through the Black Sea (and possibly
Turkey) to the EU. The plans announced by Presi-
dent Putin in December 2014 to replace the South
Stream project by pipelines through Turkey are
also in line with this diversification strategy19.
In parallel Gazprom has been trying to increase
its control over traditional gas export pipelines (via
Ukraine and Belarus). It bought the Belarussian
transit pipelines20 and has for years been trying
to gain operational control over Ukrainian
pipelines. Despite not achieving that, it succeeded
at unbundling its supply agreements with Ukraine
from transit arrangements. Besides cutting out
‘rent-seeking’ transit countries, the direct
pipelines also give Gazprom greater flexibility to
discriminate between customers (within and out-
side the EU) by bringing the desired volumes to
the desired customers.
Beyond profit maximisation from gas sales,
Russia uses gas exports as an instrument to
achieve political goals. Altering gas prices is quite
convenient, because corresponding ‘incentives’
can be quickly granted and withdrawn by a unilat-
eral political decision and thus is helpful to main-
tain control over the recipient. The discount for the
Yanukovych administration in Ukraine after it did
not sign the EU association agreement in 2013 is
one of many examples. This only works if the ben-
efits can be targeted to individual parties or coun-
tries. This requires that Russia keeps political
control over its gas sector and hence does not
fully liberalise it. Using gas as a political instru-
ment is facilitated by opaque design of the gas
sector in Russia and the ‘targeted’ countries. In
fact, well-functioning gas markets with non-sub-
sidised prices would result in a substantial reduc-
tion in gas demand in most Commonwealth of
Independent States countries that import Russian
gas. This (together with introducing effective insti-
tutions and rule of law) might go so far as to
reduce the political dependence of these coun-
tries on Russia. Hence, one might argue that
Russia would be interested in maintaining opaque
and politicised gas sectors in its neighbourhood.
That is clearly visible in terms of Russia's inten-
tions towards Ukraine. Russia’s priority goal
remains to keep Ukraine in its ‘sphere of influ-
ence’. The gas relationship seems to be one of the
key instruments to achieve that21. This requires
preventing physical diversification and prevent-
ing Ukraine from becoming a part of the EU internal
gas market. If Russia is successful it would ensure
continued political leverage and Gazprom’s
monopolistic position on Ukrainian gas market.
In the short term, Russia seems to have significant
leverage as a reduction in (or even cut of) gas sup-
plies to Ukraine and the EU would incur a signifi-
cant economic and social cost for the EU and
Ukraine. And Russia indeed in 2014 stopped gas
supplies to Ukraine and implicitly threatened a
partial supply stop to the EU22. Recent episodes of
below-expected gas flows to Poland23, Slovakia24
and Austria25 might be interpreted as ‘warning
shots’ to remind the countries engaged in enabling
‘reverse flows’ to Ukraine of the pivotal role of
Russia for their energy supplies26, even though
cuts and decreases are usually subject to con-
tractually foreseen compensation or penalties.
Apart from the threat of short-term supply disrup-
tions, Russia can also harm some EU member
states by partly bypassing their gas transit sys-
tems. The Slovakian Transmission System Opera-
tor Eustream for example earned about €300
million27 in 2013 by transiting 52.5 bcm of gas.
Given the existing excess pipeline capacities,
rerouting of large volumes of gas is feasible and is
taking place28. Should South Stream be com-
pleted, Gazprom could essentially empty each
individual line at convenience.
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On a similar timescale, Russia can seek to reduce
its reliance on exports to the EU by establishing
alternative export markets, namely China. The
deal signed between China and Russia in May
2014 does, however, reveal the weakness of this
approach29. The high capital cost30 will be difficult
to be recoup from the agreed low gas price of
$350/tcm31, which is below what Poland or
Ukraine are paying.
Gazprom could also try to increase gas prices for
its European consumers. This would, however,
have a significant down-side for Gazprom because
many European customers would then switch to
other sources32. In 2012 for example, when
Gazprom’s prices were relatively high, Norway
became the largest exporter to the EU. Only after
Gazprom agreed to renegotiate prices in its long-
term contracts with many EU utilities33, did it
regain its pole position. In practice, Gazprom could
only establish higher prices for customers that for
technical reasons do not have access to other
sources, by blocking the ongoing renegotiations
on existing long-term contracts or by gaming the
spot market.
Another instrument Russia can use and is using to
affect member states' energy policies is not
directly related deals. A prominent example has
been the deal to build and finance the extension of
the Paks nuclear power plant in Hungary by Russ-
ian state-owned company Rosatom34. This seem-
ingly favourable deal makes it more difficult for the
Hungarian government to act against with Russ-
ian energy interests in the EU35, as anecdotal evi-
dence about the Hungarian stop of reverse flows
to Ukraine in September 2014 suggests.
There has also been discussion on whether
Gazprom might use the infrastructure it acquired
in the EU36 (gas storage and pipelines) to exercise
pressure on EU policymakers. DIW (2014) argues
that the impact would be limited and third party
access (TPA) provisions would make it legally dif-
ficult for Gazprom to use those to cut off con-
sumers. In any case, infrastructure assets such as
‘Russia can seek to reduce its reliance on gas exports to the EU by establishing alternative
export markets, namely China. The May 2014 deal between China and Russia, however, reveals
a weakness: the high capital cost will be difficult to be recoup from the agreed low gas price.’
German pipelines or Latvian storage, long-term
transit contracts and exemptions from EU regula-
tions (as for the Gazelle or OPAL pipelines) provide
Gazprom with substantial influence over the gas
market. 
Russia is and has been using very much the same
instruments over the past decade to influence
Ukraine’s energy policy. Given the contractual
arrangements and the strong reliance of Ukraine
on Russian gas, Russia is much more flexible with
respect to altering gas prices. Given the energy
intensity of the country and the existing subsidy
schemes, this has a huge immediate impact on
the government budget and on socio-economic
development. Given abandoned reforms in the
sector, inefficient institutions, corruption and  the
lack of transparency that have prevailed so far in
the Ukrainian gas sector, a whole range of addi-
tional instruments have been used (personal ties,
shadow businesses etc) to benefit Russian inter-
ests. Side-dealings with influential Ukrainian oli-
garchs such as Dmytry Firtasch, who was allowed
to buy Russian gas at discount prices, gave Russia
additional leverage in the Ukrainian political
system37.
In the longer-term, however, the effectiveness of
Russia's instruments might be reduced should
Ukraine diversify its imports, reduce consump-
tion, increase domestic production38 and deeply
reform its gas sector.
The European Union
The EU is one of the world's largest consumers of
natural gas39 and it is interested in low prices and
secure supply. To this end it devised two major
policies: (i) integrating member-state sectors into
a single European energy market40 and (ii) encour-
aging a reduction of dependence on Russian gas
imports. The internal market should allow member
states to more efficiently use the existing infra-
structure (eg share pipelines and storage) and
encourage competition at all stages of the value
chain in order to bring down the price. Having alter-
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natives to Russian gas should not only make
supply more secure, but would also increase com-
petitive pressure on Gazprom and hence allow
lower prices. For this and other reasons, the EU as
a whole and its member states support a whole
array of alternatives to Russian gas, from reduced
energy consumption (ie energy efficiency meas-
ures), to use of alternative fuels such as renew-
ables, to alternative gas sources (eg liquid natural
gas, Nabucco and domestic shale gas). However,
there are difficult energy policy trade-offs. For
example phasing-out of nuclear in Germany and
encouraging the switch from coal to gas for climate
policy reasons lead to an increase in Europe’s gas
demand.
But the member states are not only partners, they
are also competing with each other for the cheap-
est and most secure energy supply. Conse-
quently, some member states (eg Germany) that
already enjoy a diversified supply portfolio are not
unhappy with Gazprom’s ability to differentiate
prices contrary to the interests of other member
states (eg Poland). This also holds for some Euro-
pean companies with which Gazprom has privi-
leged relationships and which are aware that full
integration and completion of the EU internal gas
market will increase downstream competition and
consecutively align gas prices, thus also hurting
their interests.
Some EU member states are also important trad-
ing and/or transit countries for Russian gas. Slo-
vakia is a major gas transit country, Austria
benefits from the Baumgarten trading hub and
Hungary has been hoping to benefit from South
Stream. Hence, these member states prefer legis-
lation that increases the value of their special
assets/position. These interests are often in line
with Gazprom’s desire for greater flexibility in sup-
plying the EU market, enabling preferential treat-
ment of some of Gazprom’s customers. Based on
their sector structure, member states differ widely
in terms of their preferred gas market organisation.
Important factors include the role of national pol-
icymakers or the way costs are shared between
different user groups. Member states also differ
when it comes to their assessment of the Russ-
ian-Ukrainian conflict, which is related to difficul-
ties in agreeing a common position on EU
short-term policy towards Russia (sanctions,
impact on gas cooperation) and Ukraine (scale
and scope of EU engagement, also in the gas
sector).
The EU and its member states have multiple
instruments to pursue their interests. They might
reject buying Russian gas in the short term, which
could imply a substantial loss of revenues for
Gazprom and the Russian budget. This would,
however, only work if it would not trigger contrac-
tual penalties (eg by referring to ‘force majeure’)41
and it would impose substantial costs on Euro-
pean gas consumers that would be forced to look
for alternative sources in the short term. As the
costs borne by different consumers would differ,
this would require concrete compensation
schemes. In the longer term Europe might enable
alternative supply routes and reduce its gas con-
sumption. Making Gazprom’s market share con-
testable will force them to accept lower prices. It
would increase security of supply even if
Gazprom’s actual market share stays high
because of competitive prices. In this respect, the
US-born unconventional gas revolution – largely
thanks to shale gas, US gas production in the last
decade increased by 40 percent – and increased
liquidity of LNG markets are transforming the nat-
ural gas market in Europe’s favour. The correspon-
ding investments might, however, not be privately
beneficial. So some administrative mechanism42
might be needed to make such socially-beneficial
projects attractive to private investors.
In addition, Europe can use and has used its
internal energy market and competition policy to
undermine Gazprom’s selective pricing strategy in
Europe. Additional internal infrastructure such as
‘reverse flow’ capacities have been introduced
since 2009, and increasing the physical
interconnectedness further is a priority of
Europe’s energy security strategy43. This also
entails the enforcement of third-party access to
Gazprom’s European infrastructure. Beyond
granting network access, competition policy is
also a potentially sharp sword. In September
2012, the European Commission in its
competition role opened proceedings against
Gazprom arguing that its (i) dividing of gas
markets, (ii) preventing diversification of supplies
and (iii) linking the price of gas to oil prices44 might
be illegal. A settlement decision could require
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sit system through either the Nord Stream pipeline
or Belarus49. Hence, Ukraine can block a substan-
tial fraction of gas deliveries to the countries to its
west. Blocking transit might lose effect should
South Stream, new pipelines through Turkey
and/or Nord Stream 3&4 allow Ukraine to be
bypassed entirely, or it might become more diffi-
cult when transit is operated by an independent
operator. Naftogaz’s substantial legacy debt forms
a minor monetary leverage because Russia might
find it difficult to enforce the repayment if no
agreement acceptable for Ukraine is found.
On the other hand Ukraine might offer access to
its gas assets. For at least several months it has
been doing just that by (1) making information on
gas flows and storage publicly available on Euro-
pean transparency platforms, (2) offering EU com-
panies easy access to its storage facilities, (3)
encouraging participation in infrastructure pri-
vatisation and (4) presenting itself in the longer
term as possibly an important gas hub in an inte-
grated European gas market. Access to Ukraine’s
storage facilities and its potential to produce gas is
valuable in a longer-term perspective to both the
EU and Russia as part of their strategies related to
European gas market development. Ukraine
remains also an important gas consumer and –
once it succeeds in completely reforming its inter-
nal gas prices – export market50. 
Conclusions:
In general terms, we conclude that Russia in its
gas relationship with Ukraine has a well-defined
objective: keeping Ukraine in its sphere of influ-
ence both for political reasons and, in the medium
to long term, in order to maximise its gas rev-
enues. Its objectives for the EU are to maximise
profits and maintain some leverage, especially by
maintaining strong bilateral relations with specific
member states.
Ukraine seeks to reduce its gas-dependency on
Russia, to regain political control over its gas
sector and to benefit more from its transit assets
‘Russia aims to keep  Ukraine in its sphere of influence for political reasons and to maximise gas
revenues. Its objectives for the EU are to maximise profits and maintain some leverage,
especially by maintaining bilateral relations with specific member states.’
Gazprom to alter its core business model and
practices. The EU can also (as it has started to do)
increase the role of EU regulations and competition
rules in its neighbourhood through an increasing
role for the instruments and rule-enforcement
mechanisms of the Energy Community.
Ukraine
Ukraine should be interested in low gas import
prices, high transit revenues, developing its
domestic gas resources45 and an efficient domes-
tic gas sector. To achieve this, Ukraine would have
to (i) reduce its reliance on Russian gas by
encouraging diversification and energy effi-
ciency46, (ii) maintain its pivotal transit role by
concluding stable transit arrangements with its
neighbours and last but not least (iii) reform its
gas sector. But, despite repeated announcements,
implementation has been held back by (i) fear of
losing the support of the electorate and influential
interest groups over the necessary adjustment of
gas tariffs (households pay about $50 per
1000m³), (ii) the unwillingness to undo this rent-
generating machine (cross-subsidies amount to
the order of 6 percent of GDP47) and (iii) openly
obstructive policies from Russia48. One constant
impediment to forward-looking reforms has been
the uncertainty over the gas supply contract with
Russia. The contract has hindered diversification
and demand reduction, given the high volumes
Ukraine has to pay for up to 2019. However, con-
tinued over-focusing on the contract issue paral-
yses all structural reform.
The Ukrainian focus is again on revising the con-
tract. This is somewhat dangerous, because it is
unclear if Ukraine already has the regulatory and
physical preconditions for getting a significantly
better deal. Without political support and physical
reverse flows from the EU, Ukraine is certainly not
in a position to escape its dilemma.
Ukraine has one major leverage over the EU and
Russia – gas transit. Only 60 percent of Russian
exports to the EU can bypass the Ukraine gas tran-
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and gas resources. The necessary structural shifts
are difficult to implement because most political
attention is currently focused on the short-term.
The required long-term commitment is barely
credible in Ukraine. Integration with the EU energy
market is the only credible anchor that would
enable the difficult reforms and facilitate the nec-
essary investments51.
The EU still needs to define its strategic goals for
its energy relationships with Ukraine and Russia.
So far it has been trying to muddle through by sup-
porting Russia’s position on securing stable tran-
sit, while helping Ukraine to reduce its reliance on
Russia.
In summary, each side has advantages over the
others. While Russia has comparatively strong
leverage over Ukraine and the EU in the short term,
its advantage quickly wears off. Ukraine’s main
instrument – blocking gas transit – is also set to
become irrelevant quickly. The EU is vulnerable in
the short-term, but in the long-term, global gas
market developments seem to run in its favour. It
will, however, require political action for the EU to
translate these developments into lower gas
import prices, a more resilient energy supply and
more efficient gas markets.
THREE POSSIBLE OUTCOMES 
Given the state of affairs we have described, we
will describe three different outcomes. 
In the default scenario, the EU would remain split
over its gas policy towards third countries. This
implies business-as-usual with Russia and no
prospect for Ukraine to join the EU energy market.
Without a European commitment to provide this
anchor for regulatory reform in Ukraine, corre-
sponding reforms are not credible. Each Ukrainian
government will be faced with the choice of some
short-term benefits in terms of low Russian gas
prices and high transit revenues, even if it perpet-
uates the addiction to Russian gas (and in a wider
sense allows Russia to continue to set the rules of
the game). This will preclude a deep reform of the
sector. Abundant volume take-or-pay contracts
with Gazprom make access of new exporters to
the Ukrainian market difficult and discourage most
physical diversification projects. With the EU
agreeing to bypass pipelines or not guaranteeing
reverse flows, Ukraine will be deprived of any
advantages in negotiations with Russia. Without
its strategic value, it is then possible that Ukraine
will at some point render the control of the gas
transit system to Gazprom. This might impede
access to the gas transmission system for com-
panies seeking to produce gas in Ukraine52.
Together with the regulatory environment, this will
make increases in domestic production (which
could reduce Ukraine's import dependency53)
much more difficult.
The effect on Ukraine certainly extends beyond
the gas sector. Without EU support, Russia is likely
to regain a significant leverage over Ukraine's pol-
itics. The effects would be felt in the entire EU
Source: Bruegel. Note: cost and effect are classified high, medium and low. Upper flash in each box shows cost; lower flash
shows effect. Red = high, yellow = medium, green = low.
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neighbourhood as a failure of the EU to defend its
own rules (and in consequence would limit the
effectiveness of EU foreign policy).
The impact on the EU gas sector of this scenario
might be limited, though if Russia can fully control
Ukrainian gas infrastructure (both pipelines and
storage) it might be even better able to game the
central and east European markets54 and so pre-
serve current market segmentation and hamper
completion of the EU internal gas market. It would
also mean a significant limitation of the EU’s exter-
nal energy policy instruments, specifically by
making the ‘Energy Community’ redundant.
A less likely scenario would be that the EU takes a
common stance to assist Ukraine with gas-sector
reforms, to support it by preventing South Stream,
to help settle Ukraine’s contractual and debt
issues with Russia and to guarantee reverse flows
(we think the EU could mobilise the necessary
financial and political capital). If support is granted
without enforcing deep reforms in Ukraine, such a
strategy would risk making the EU dependent on
transit through Ukraine (and Ukraine’s willingness
to pay its gas bills to western suppliers). Ukrain-
ian policymakers might feel tempted to avoid
committing to a difficult reform agenda, and to
alternately seek short-term benefits from both
sides. At worst, the persistence of a murky gas
sector in Ukraine might allow European support to
be captured by private interests. As the corre-
sponding transfers by the EU would barely be
politically sustainable, it would essentially be an
expensive detour for getting to the first scenario.
In the final scenario, the EU – if united and deter-
mined – would be able to set the rules of Russia-
Ukraine-EU gas relations. For this, Europe would
first need to redefine its gas relationship with
Russia. The global shift in market power from sup-
pliers to buyers needs to be properly reflected in
the EU. This should allow lower European gas
prices and more flexibility in setting its own rules
(irrespective of the interests of suppliers). The
main problem on the EU side is the diverging inter-
‘The global shift in market power from suppliers to buyers should give the EU access to lower
gas prices and more flexibility to set its own rules, irrespective of supplier's interests. But the
main problem for the EU is the diverging interests of its members.’
ests of its members, which so far have prevented
a redefinition of the gas relationship. The case
must be made that shared strategic objectives
outweigh individual countries' short-term benefits.
In some cases, partial compensation for extreme
cases might be possible55. The second issue is
that Russia will exercise its instruments to prevent
this redefinition of the gas relationship. This would
require the EU to credibly demonstrate closeness
through tangible rules on solidarity between
member states. Finally, it has to be decided which
redesign Europe wants to achieve. We see four
important areas:
1 Enforcing the present competition and internal
market rules against all market participants,
including Gazprom. 
2 Refocusing the EU security of supply strategy
from reducing dependence on Russian gas to
reducing EU vulnerability to import depend-
ency. The ultimate goal should be to guarantee
EU access to cheap Russian gas supplies on
non-discriminatory, free-trade basis. Reducing
the negative consequences of over-reliance on
Russian gas is needed in central and eastern
European countries and the Balkans, but not for
the EU as a whole. 
3 An enlarged and unified European gas market
could increase European bargaining power on
global gas markets. Hence the EU should beef
up the ‘Energy Community’ to make it an instru-
ment that provides its non-EU members with an
anchor for implementing European energy
market rules. This is contingent on the prospect
of access to all obligations and benefits of the
internal energy market – including solidarity. 
4 The current energy market design falls short in
delivering efficient investment and usage of
energy infrastructure. It would for example
require a mechanism that ensures for all cus-
tomers energy security that does not rely on
national energy policies56. So a reform of the
internal energy market’s design and gover-
nance is necessary. As Energy Community
members will have to follow these rules, they
should be represented in this process.
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If there is no cooperative approach from Russia,
the EU should prepare for a prolonged period of
uncertainty in energy relations with Russia. In
such a scenario the EU-Russia gas relationship will
continue on a case-by-case basis, but only in
accordance with EU rules. This is only credible if
the EU is always prepared for a disruption or cuts
in gas supplies from Russia (total stop of Russian
gas transit via Ukraine seems possible in case of
prolonged problems in Ukraine’s and the EU’s rela-
tionships with Russia).
In its relationship with Ukraine, Europe should
serve as an anchor for reforming the Ukrainian gas
sector – it should lend Ukraine its regulatory
framework and enforcement mechanisms. With-
out such an anchor, Ukraine will be locked-in to
short-termism and will likely spiral back into the
Russian orbit. We propose the following five steps:
1 Ukraine and the EU need to come up with a firm
timetable to implement EU gas sector regula-
tion in Ukraine. Early steps should include
implementing full transparency of Ukrainian
gas sector operations, organising non-discrim-
inatory access to Ukrainian transit and stor-
age57, an ambitious schedule for cancelling gas
price subsidies58 and improving the monitoring
of gas flows. This requires significant technical
assistance. 
2 Ukraine should buy option contracts for gas
from the west (maybe with some EU
guarantees) to demonstrate to Russia its ability
to live without Russian gas for the next winter.
Corresponding contracts should be established
largely on a market basis to avoid Ukraine
becoming addicted to cheap EU gas.
3 Ukraine should deeply restructure its gas
sector. One option is allowing for the bank-
ruptcy of the state-owned incumbent Naftogaz.
This might allow Ukraine to fully dissolve this
deeply corrupt company and dissociate the
state from Naftogaz’s obligations, while retain-
ing control over the pipeline system which was
only leased to Naftogaz. The implications of
such a radical step would need to be carefully
assessed because potentially endless legal
battles that might arise could weigh heavily on
the attractiveness of the sector to investors. 
4 To speed up the restructuring process, Europe
might pre-privatise the pipeline system. That,
is a European agent (such as the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development)
could buy a significant share of the pipeline
system and lead the reorganisation with its
own management team. The shares of the Euro-
pean agent and Ukraine could be sold to the
market at a later stage – when the market value
of the company has hopefully increased. This
should also increase the incentives for regula-
tory reform. 
5 Renegotiation of the 2009 contract with Russia
can only be successful when the EU promises
to step in if Russia does not want to cooperate.
Such a commitment from the EU would only be
sensible after Ukraine’s reforms reach a point
of no return.
NOTES
1 President Putin said on 1 December 2014 that Russia would stop the construction of the South Stream gas pipeline
because of EU regulatory hurdles.
2 Gazprom and its partners seek full exemption from the third-party access rule to limit the access of competitors to
OPAL – a pipeline that brings gas from the Nord Stream pipeline to central and eastern Europe and southern Ger-
many.
3 Ukraine has been importing small quantities of gas via connections with Poland and Hungary since 2012. Reverse
flow capacities and supplies increased after the cut in Russian gas supplies in mid-2014; presently capacities
available via Poland, Hungary and most importantly Slovakia account to about 40 mcm/day.
4 For an analysis of the complicated Russia-Ukraine gas relationship see Balmaceda (2013); on gas supply disrup-
tions in 2005-06 and 2008-09 see Stern (2006), Pirani et al (2009) and Loskot-Strachota (2009).
5 After Yanukovych resigned from signing the Association Agreement with the EU during the Eastern Partnership
Summit in Vilnius, November 2013.
6 In April 2014, Russia canceled the Kharkov agreement of 2010 that implied a $100/tcm export tax discount in
return for the prolongation (2017-2042) of the agreement on the lease of the Crimean port of Sevastopol to the
Russian Black Sea fleet.
7 In addition, Gazprom claims debts of up to $18.5 billion for unpaid take-or-pay obligations; see TASS (2014).
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8 Unless consensually agreed differently: contract documents posted by Ukrainskaya Pravda (2014) suggest that
Naftogaz could seek to agree with Gazprom six months in advance of each year up to 20 percent lower volumes.
9 For details, see Kardas, Kononczuk, Loskot-Strachota (2014).
10 See Gazprom’s demands that Ukraine prepays for November gas supplies (2 bcm) rejected by Ukraine (Naftogaz
claiming it will order Russian gas and prepay for it only if and when needed) and Gazprom saying that risk to tran-
sit security is at a critical level in November 2014 because of insufficient gas stored in Ukraine for transit stability
reasons; see eg RIA Novosti (2014).
11 According to ENI (2014) it can continue to produce at current pace for more than 75 years.
12 It is very difficult to clearly distinguish between the objectives of Russia (ie its government) and Gazprom. To be con-
sistent, we will see Gazprom as a tool of Russia, that has the main objective of generating income, but that can also
be used for political purposes.
13 Liquified natural gas (LNG) can be exported by Novatek and Rosneft (Kardas, 2013) and these two companies
might also be allowed to conduct exports (in particular to the Asian market) in the future.
14 This can be illustrated by the asset-swap deal with German Wintershall which gave Gazprom’s subsidiary Wingas
full ownership of several gas pipelines (Gascade) and shares in storage facilities.
15 Gazprom and its partners have asked the European Commission to grant a full exemption (according to Article 36
Directive 2009/73/EC) from third-party access for South Stream and the OPAL pipeline. If allowed, this would give
the consortia full control of modes of use of these pipelines.
16 Yet depressed demand and lasting problems of the EU gas industry plus changes on the EU gas market have led
many EU companies to take on this risk.
17 Gazprom granted, for example, refused for a long time a price reduction for Lithuania after it advanced the work on
its LNG terminal (see WSJ, 2014).
18 See eg arguments by Konoplyanik (2014), an advisor to the CEO of Gazprom Export, made during the Russia-EU
Informal Consultations on 3rd Energy Package, July 2014.
19 The head of Gazprom told Russia 24 on 6 December 2014 that “once the new pipeline becomes operational, the role
of Ukraine as a transit country will be reduced to zero”.
20 Accomplished after construction of Nord Stream which allowed Gazprom to by-pass Belarussian pipelines. After
transit volumes through Belarus were reduced, Belarus finally sold the pipeline to Gazprom, which than started to
shift volumes from the Ukraine transit system to the Belarus transit system. In 2011, about 32 percent of the gas
to Poland and Slovakia flowed via Belarus; from Nov 2011-Jan 2012 this decreased to 27-29 percent and after rose
to 44 percent (IEA).
21 Other economic instruments used for Georgia and Moldova are blocking remittances and free trade.
22 See eg Reuters (2014).
23 From 8 September; see Gaz-System (2014).
24 From 10 September; see Ministry of Economy of Slovak Republic (2014).
25 See eg WSJ (2014a).
26 For more see eg Loskot-Strachota (2014).
27 Eustreams net profits were €319 million and it claims that 90 percent of its business is international gas trans-
mission.
28 Gas flows via the Ukraine-Slovakia route in September 2014 were 29.7 percent of September 2013 volumes, while
in the same month via Nord Stream they were 179 percent of 2013 volumes. See IEA data for Gas Trade Flows in
Europe.
29 It is not clear if this agreement is just another deal in a series of memorandums of understanding between Russia
and China concluded since 2004, or if it is the final breakthrough. On 10 October 2014, Gazprom announced that
an intergovernmental agreement for Russian gas supply to China will be ready soon – indicating that it does still
need to be concluded; see Gazprom (2014).
30 The envisaged ‘Power of Siberia’ project involves exploring the new Chayandinskoye field and building a 4,000 km
pipeline. For details see eg Kardas (2014).
31 For example, Fortune (2014).
32 As they already do when gas prices are higher than energy from renewable sources or coal.
33 For example, GDF SUEZ, Wingas GmbH, SPP, Sinergie Italiane, and Econgas and E.on renegotiated their long-term
Gazprom contracts in 2011-12.
34 See Bloomberg (2014) or Sadecki and Kardas (2014).
35 An important nuclear deal has also been made with Rosatom by Finland. Slovakia is presently in a quite difficult sit-
uation because it is renegotiating not only a gas supply agreement but also oil supply and transit contracts with
Russian companies.
36 For a summary see DIW (2014).
37 See  for example Reuters (2014a).
38 For a list of options see Zachmann and Naumenko (2014).
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